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In international relations, the Lesson of Munich refers to the appeasement of Adolf Hitler at the Munich Conference in September of 1938. In order to avoid war, France and Britain permitted the German annexation of the Sudetenland. The policy of appeasement underestimated Hitler’s ambitions and believed sufficient concessions would secure a lasting peace.〔Norrin M. Ripsman and Jack S. Levy, "Wishful Thinking or Buying Time? The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930s," ''International Security'' 33/2 (Fall 2008): 148.〕 Today, it is widely regarded as a failed act of appeasement toward Germany, and a huge diplomatic triumph for Hitler. The agreement facilitated the German takeover of Czechoslovakia, and caused Hitler to believe the Western allies would not risk war over Poland the following year. The foreign policy of the British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain has become inextricably linked with the events of the Munich Crisis and the policy of appeasement, resonating through the following decades as a parable of diplomatic failure. 〔Igor Lukes and Erik Goldstein, ''The Munich Crisis, 1938: Prelude to World War II'' (Oxon: Frank Cass, 1999), 276 〕 Together with “Waterloo” and “Versailles”, the Munich Conference has come to signify a disastrous diplomatic outcome.〔 Igor Lukes and Erik Goldstein, ''The Munich Crisis, 1938: Prelude to World War II'' (Oxon: Frank Cass, 1999), iv 〕 The Lessons of Munich have profoundly shaped Western foreign policy up to this day. In the United States, Presidents have cited these lessons as justifications for war in Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq.〔Norrin M. Ripsman and Jack S. Levy, "Wishful Thinking or Buying Time? The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930s," ''International Security'' 33/2 (Fall 2008): 148 〕 Following the strike on Libya, Ronald Reagan argued “Europeans who remember their history understand better than most that there is no security, no safety, in the appeasement of evil.”〔Robert J. Beck, "Munich's Lessons Reconsidered," ''International Security'' 14/2 (Fall 1989): 161.〕 Although appeasement - conventionally defined as the act of satisfying grievances through concessions, with the aim of avoiding war - was once regarded as an effective and honourable strategy of foreign policy, following the Munich Conference it came to symbolize cowardice, failure, and weakness with Winston Churchill describing appeasement as “one who feeds a crocodile, hoping it will eat him last.” 〔Norrin M. Ripsman and Jack S. Levy, "Wishful Thinking or Buying Time? The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930s," ''International Security'' 33/2 (Fall 2008): 149〕 ==References== * Robert J. Beck. "Munich's Lessons Reconsidered". ''International Security'', Vol. 14, No. 2. (Autumn, 1989), pp. 161–191. * Igor Lukes and Erik Goldstein, ''The Munich Crisis, 1938: Prelude to World War II'' (Oxon:Frank Cass, 1999) * Norrin M. Ripsman and Jack S. Levy, "Wishful Thinking or Buying Time? The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930s," ''International Security'' 33/2 (Fall 2008): pp. 148-181. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Lesson of Munich」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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